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IV

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The Idaho Department of Insurance (hereinafter "Department" or "Respondent") is an
agency of the State of Idaho as provided by title 41, Idaho Code. Two Jinn, Inc., which does
business in Idaho as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Aladdin" or
"Two Jinn") appealed from the Memorandum and Order of the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District dated May 3, 2011. c.R., pp. 122 - 129. This Court should affirm the Final
Order of the District Court that affirmed the decision of the Department's declaratory ruling that
Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits bail agents and sureties from entering an indemnity agreement at
the time of the bail transaction for reimbursement of apprehension expenses in the event that a
bonded defendant fails to appear in court.
B.

Statement of the Case.

This is a statement of the case to the extent that the Department does not agree with the
statement of the case as provided by Aladdin. The Department believes that the Third Paragraph
has significance as stated by Aladdin in its Opening Brief at page 2. However, the Department
believes that the Third Paragraph cannot be included in the original or initial bail bond
transaction, but subsequent thereto, in accordance with section 41-1042, Idaho Code.

II. ISSUE ON APPEAL
Should this Court affirm the Final Order of the District Court finding that section 411042, Idaho Code, prohibits Aladdin from using the indemnity agreement in its bail bond
contract for reimbursement of recovery costs as a part of the initial bail transaction?
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III. ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review

On appeal from the decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, "acting in its appellate
capacity under the [Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter "IDAPA")], the Supreme
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision .... The Court
does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact. ... Rather, this Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. . .. The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court,
even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by evidence in the record." Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 132, 18
P.3d 185, 187 (2003)(referencing Idaho Code § 67-5279(1»(citations omitted).
Upon review, the Supreme Court "must affirm the [Department's] action unless the
[Department's] decision (a) violates statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the
statutory authority of the

[Department]; (c) is made upon unlawful procedure; (d) is not

supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion." Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 272, 207 P.3d 998, 1004 (2009)(citing

Marcia T. Turner, L.L.c. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 207, 159 P.3d 840, 844 (2007».
See, Idaho Code § 67-5279. "[I]n matters involving the exercise of discretion, this Court does not
substitute its discretion for that of the decision maker." Turner, id., 144 Idaho at 209, 159 P.3d
at 845. "A strong presumption of validity favors an agency's actions." Young Elect. Sign Co. v.

State, ex reI. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 807, 25 P.3d 117, 120 (2001). The Department has been
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entrusted with enforcement of the Idaho Insurance Code, title 41, Idaho Code. The Court may
defer to the Department's "interpretation of the statutes as long as that interpretation is
reasonable and not contrary to the express language of the statute." Kuna Boxing Club, Inc. v.
Idaho Lottery Commission, 149 Idaho 94, 97, 233 P.3d 25, 28 (2009). See, Idaho Code § 41-

210.
Regardless, '''the ultimate responsibility to construe legislative language to determine the
law' rests with the judiciary, and the underlying consideration whether to grant such deference is
to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent." Kuna Boxing Club, Inc., 149 Idaho at 97, 233
P.3d at 28 (quoted citations omitted).
"[T]he party attacking an agency decision must first show that the agency erred in a
manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), and then it must show that a substantial right has
been prejudiced." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 166 P.3d 374
(2007). See, section 67-5279(3) and (4), Idaho Code.

B.

Idaho Code § 41-1042 Prohibits All Charges in a Bail Transaction Not
Specifically Allowed in That Section.

Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a bail agent in any bail
transaction shall not, directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or other
valuable consideration from any person except for the following:
(a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer;
(b) To provide collateral;
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(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection
with the bail transaction, limited to the following:
(i) Expenditures

actually

and

reasonable

incurred

to

verify

underwriting information or to pay for notary public fees; provided
however, that the total of all such expenditures reimbursed shall
not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and
(ii) Travel expenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a
bail agent's place of business, which includes any city or locality
in which the bail agent advertises or engages in bail business, up to
the amount allowed by the internal revenue service for business
travel for the year in which the travel occurs.
(2) Except as permitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any charge
for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document all
expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement.
Idaho Code § 41-1042.
Stated otherwise, aside from clear exceptions that include premiums, collateral, and
reimbursement of actual expenses as described above, a bail agent cannot "directly or indirectly,
charge or collect money or other valuable consideration" from any person in any bail transaction.
Idaho Code § 41-1042. The reimbursement of "actual expenses" includes (1) "expenditures
actually and reasonably incurred to verify underwriting information," including recording, long
distance telephone fees, etc., provided that the "total of all such expenditures reimbursed shall
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not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and" (2) travel expenses "incurred more than twenty-five (25)
miles from a bail agent's place of business ... up to the amount allowed by the internal revenue
service for business travel for the year in which the travel occurs." Idaho Code § 41-1042(1)(c).
In the original action before the Department, Aladdin asked the Department for a
declaratory judgment in accordance with section 67-5232(1), Idaho Code, to:
declare that I.C § 41-1042 does not preclude bail agents or their surety from
entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of the bail transaction which
permits them to recover from a criminal defendant or third party indemnitor actual
expenses later incurred ir [sic] connection with the apprehension and surrender of
a criminal defendant who has failed to appear as required in court. As set forth
more fully herein, to declare otherwise is contrary to the plain language of I.C
§ 41-1042, the legislature's intent in enacting this statute and sound public policy

concerning bail bonds.
A.R., p. 2.
In response, the Department asserted that the "plain language of the (Idaho Code § 411042] is clear: A bail agent may accept nothing of value in any bail transaction unless it is listed
in [section 41-1042(1)]. As the promise to reimburse Two Jinn and Danielson (the surety] for
apprehension costs constitutes valuable consideration, this term, i.e., the Third [Paragraph], is not
allowed in their bail bond agreement." A.R., p. 17.
The third paragraph of Aladdin's standard bail bond agreement (hereinafter Third
Paragraph) is designed to recover apprehension costs of an escaping bonded defendant.
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See, A.R., p. 12. The Third Paragraph states:
THIRD:

To reimburse [Aladdin] and Surety for actual expenses incurred and

caused by a breach by the Principal of the terms for the Application and Bail
Bond were written, including all expenses or liabilities incurred as a result of
searching for, recapturing or returning Principal to custody, incurred by [Aladdin]
or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or endeavoring to apprehend Principal,
including legal fees incurred by [Aladdin] or Surety in making application to a
court for an order to vacate or to set aside the order of forfeiture or Judgment
entered thereon. However, no expense or liabilities incurred for recapturing or
returning Principal to custody shall be chargeable after the entry of Judgment.
A.R., p. 12.
The Third Paragraph requires the indemnitor (whether it is the defendant or other
guarantor) to pay apprehension expenses and related legal fees. It is an integral part of Aladdin's
bail bond agreement, otherwise known as the Indemnity Agreement.

See, A.R., p. 12. For

example, of the twelve paragraphs of the Indemnity Agreement, Paragraph "TENTH"

I

(hereinafter "Tenth Paragraph") provides that the contractual obligations of the principaldefendant and any indemnitor are ''joint and several," which includes the obligations set out in
the Third Paragraph. A.R., p. 12. The Tenth Paragraph also permits Aladdin or the surety to
"TENTH: The obligations hereunder are joint and several and any amounts due shall bear interest at the
maximum rate of interest allowed by law. The Second Party and the Surety shall not be first obliged to proceed
against the Principal on Bail Bond before having recourse against the First Party or anyone of them, the First Party
hereby expressly waiving the benefits of law requiring the Second Party or the Surety to make claim upon or to
proceed or enforce its remedies against the Principal before making demand upon or proceeding and/or enforcing its
remedies against anyone or more of the First Party."
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proceed against any indemnitor without first seeking remedy from the principal-defendant. The
terms, obligations and waivers set out in the Tenth Paragraph include the rights and obligations
in the Third Paragraph. A.R., p. 12.

In addition, Paragraph "EIGHTH,,2 (hereinafter "Eighth Paragraph") provides that any
money or other property deposited with Aladdin may be levied against to cover any
"hereinabove obligations, liabilities, losses, costs, damages and expenses[,]" which includes
expenses set out in the Third Paragraph. See, A.R., p. 12.
As a remedy to recover apprehension costs and part of the original bail transaction, the
Third Paragraph is a prohibited contractual term of Aladdin's bail agreement under section 411042(1), Idaho Code.
C.

The Language in Idaho Code § 41-1042 Is Not Ambiguous.

Idaho Code § 41-1042 is clear and unambiguous. It expressly prohibits a bail agent from
charging any person money or other valuable consideration, directly or indirectly, in any bail
transaction except as listed in subsection (l)(a), (b), and (c) of section 41-1042. Because it does
not meet the specific exceptions provided in section 41-1042, the Third Paragraph is a prohibited
charge or collection in the bail transaction.

"EIGHTH: That all money or other property which the [Principal-defendant] has deposited or may deposit
with [Aladdin] or the Surety may be applied as collateral security or indemnity for matters contained herein, and to
accomplish the purposes contained herein, the Second Party and/or Surety is authorized to lawfully levy upon said
collateral in the manner provided by law and to apply the proceeds therefrom and any and all money deposited to
payment or reimbursement for the hereinabove obligations, liabilities, losses, costs, damages and expenses. If
collateral received by Second Party is in excess of the bail forfeited, such excess shall be returned to the depositor
immediately upon the application of the collateral to the forfeiture, subject to any claim of Second Party and Surety
for unpaid premium on the hereinabove charges.
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"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed
as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows
the law as written.'" Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, et ai, -- Idaho --, -- P.3d- (Sup.Ct. No. 37574-2010 (2011 Opinion No. 115) (Idaho 2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139
Idaho 360, 362, 79 P2d 719, 721 (2003».
'''We have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous legislative
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature'" Verska v. St. Alphonsus, id. (citing City of Sun Valley

v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961,963 (1993».
With regard to the legal issues before it, this Court exercises free review. However, it is
noteworthy that the District Court held that Idaho Code § 41-1042 "is plain, clear, and
unambiguous and this Court would uphold the agency's interpretation of it, even if it was entitled
to no deference." c.R., p. 127 (Memorandum Decision and Order at p. 6).
In order to procure a bail bond, Aladdin requires its clientele to execute its bail bond
agreement with the Third Paragraph as a term of the contract. The Third Paragraph violates
Idaho Code § 41-1042 because it is a part of the bail transaction and, as valuable consideration, it
does not fall within any of the limited exceptions set forth in subsections (1)(a), (b), or (c) of
section 41-1042.

D.

Idaho Code § 41-1042 Prohibits Recovery of Apprehension Costs in the Bail
Transaction as Provided in Aladdin's Third Paragraph.
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1.

The Third Paragraph is part of the bail transaction.

Aladdin argues that the Third Paragraph is not a part of the "bail transaction." See,
Appellant's Opening Brief at 7.
According to title 41, Idaho Code, the tenn "bail" means a "monetary amount required by
the court to release the defendant from custody and to ensure his appearance in court as ordered."
Idaho Code § 41-1038(1). The term "bail bond" means a "financial guarantee, posted by a bail
agent and underwritten by a surety insurance company, that the defendant will appear as
ordered." Idaho Code § 41-1038(3).
The term "bail bond agreement" is defined as a "suretyship contract between the state on
one side and an accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantees
the appearance of an accused .... The extent of the surety's undertaking is determined by the
bond agreement and is subject to the rules of contract law and suretyship." State v. Castro, 145
Idaho 993, 995, 188 P.3d 935, 937 (Ct.App. 2008).
The term "transaction" is defined as "an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements
having some connection with each other, in which more than one person is concerned, and by
which the legal relations of such persons between themselves are altered. It is a broader term
than 'contract.'" Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 1341 (1979).
The Third Paragraph is a part of the "bail transaction,,3 not only because it is embedded in
the Aladdin bail bond agreement, but because it provides a remedy in the event of a breach of the
bail bond agreement. As demonstrated above, the Eighth and Tenth Paragraphs expand the
Title 41, Idaho Code, does not define a "bail transaction," and section 41-1042 uses the term "bail transaction"
three times.

3
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remedies contained in the Third Paragraph.

In the event the defendant fails to appear and

Aladdin wishes to avoid the use of collateral or other remedies, the Third Paragraph provides an
additional recourse usable at Aladdin's option if the bonded defendant absconds.
Aladdin "requires that [the Third Paragraph] be a provision of' the bail bond agreement.
See, Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, LL. 24-25 4 ; see, c.R., pp. 20, 82 & 117 (e.g., "Aladdin requires that this

indemnitor agree that if there is a breach of the bail agreement, then the indemnitor is
contractually liable to pay as a remedy for that breach the actual and reasonable apprehension
expenses incurred in returning the [principal] who is now a criminal fugitive to custody." c.R., p.
82.).
The Third Paragraph covers apprehension costs in the event of breach of the bail bond
agreement; the Eighth Paragraph provides Aladdin access to deposited funds for any
apprehension expenses; and the Tenth Paragraph opens the door to Aladdin to seek remedy for
apprehension costs from the indemnitor before seeking any recompense from the principal,
including any guarantee or other collateral deposited with Aladdin. The Third Paragraph then is
necessarily a part of the overall bail bond transaction as it provides Aladdin recourse in the event
the bail bond agreement is breached.

2.

As part of the bail transaction, the Third Paragraph is not a permitted
charge or collection of "other valuable consideration" under Idaho Code
§ 41-1042.

Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, states that a "bail agent in any bail transaction shall not,

"Tr. Vol. I" refers to the Hearing before Hearing Officer Jean R. Uranga on March 8,2010. 'Tr. Vol. II" refers to
the Hearing before William W. Deal, Director of the Idaho Department oflnsurance, on July 21, 2010.
4
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directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration from any person"
except for those enumerated purposes set forth in subsection (1)(a), (b), and (c). Idaho Code
§ 41-1042.

The term "consideration" includes an '''action by the promisee which is bargained for and
given in exchange for the promise.' ... It may also consist of a 'detriment to the promisee or a
benefit to the promisor. '" Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Assn., 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104,
1110 (2005).

It has also been defined as "any act, forbearance, creation, modification, or

destruction of a legal relationship, or return promise given in exchange. In order to constitute
consideration, an act or promise must be bargained for and given in exchange for the promise."
Trotzer v. Vig, 203 P.2d 1056, 1061, 149 Wash.App. 594, 606 (Ct.App. 2009). See, also, Pink v.
Busch, 691 P.2d 456, 100 Nev. 684 (1984). "A promisor receives consideration if he receives

some right, interest, profit, or other benefit from the promisee." Sterling Sav. Bank v. JHM
Properties, L.L.c., 717 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1149 (D.Or. 2010).

In exchange for bail and release of the defendant and assurance to the court of the
defendant's next appearance, Aladdin requires the defendant and any indemnitor to sign a bail
bond agreement inclusive of the Third Paragraph. See, Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, LL. 24-25; and see,
c.R., pp. 20 & 117.

Thereby, the indemnitor agrees to pay actual apprehension costs in the

event of a breach of the bail bond agreement by an absconding bonded defendant.
As a promise to Aladdin from the principal (defendant) and any indemnitor for
reimbursement of apprehension costs in the event of a breach, the Third Paragraph is a
contractual remedy conferred to Aladdin.

Therefore, the Third Paragraph is "valuable
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consideration" gi ven as a required term of the bail bond agreement entered into between the bail
agent, the surety, the principal, and the indemnitor.

3.

The Third Paragraph does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated
in Idaho Code § 41-1042(1)(a), (b), or (c).
a.

The Third Paragraph is not premium or reimbursement for actual
incidental expenses.

As noted above, Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits charges or collection of money or other
valuable consideration from any person, except for the following specific purposes: "(a) [t]o pay
premiums at the rates established by the insurer; (b) [t]o provide collateral; [or] (c) [t]o
reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection with the bail transaction"
limited to incidental expenses not to exceed $50.00 and travel expenses incurred more than
twenty-five (25) miles from a bail agent's place of business up to the amount allowed by the
Internal Revenue Service. Idaho Code § 41-1042(1).
It is clear that, as a contingent promise to pay apprehension costs, the Third Paragraph

does not involve the payment of premiums as stated in Idaho Code § 41-1042(1)(a) and it is not a
reimbursement for the actual expenses allowed by section 41-1042(1)(c).
The remaining inquiry concerns whether the Third Paragraph is a form of "collateral," as
excepted by Idaho Code § 41-1042(1 )(b).
b.

The Third Paragraph is not "collateral."

The term "collateral" is defined in title 41, Idaho Code, as "property of any kind given as
security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(4)(underscore here). A key term used in
the definition of collateral is "property." "Property" evidences:
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· .. ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose
of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else
from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition
which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or sUbjects. The exclusive
right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.

Black's Law Dictionary, 5 th Ed., p. 1095 (1979).
Property includes "both real and personal property." Idaho Code § 73-114(1). '''Real
property' [is] coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments, possessory rights and
claims." Section 73-114(2). '''Personal property' includes money, goods, chattels, things in
action, evidences of debt and general intangibles 5 as defined in the Uniform Commercial CodeSecured Transactions." Section 73-114(3).
Another key term in the definition of "collateral" in Idaho Code § 41 1038(4) is the word
"security." A security or a security interest is "an interest in personal property or fixtures that
secures payment or performance of an obligation." In re: Wiersma, 283 B.R. 294, 305 (2002)
(citing section 28-1-201(37), Idaho Code). See, also, In re: Cybernetic Services, Inc., 252 F.3d
1039, 1044, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001) ("A 'security interest' is an interest in personal property that
secures a payment or the performance of an obligation.").
As required by statute, any collateral, or property "of any kind," in the form of money,
other valuables, or other permissive liens as security deposited with the bail agent, is received by
As referenced in the foregoing section, a "general intangible" is defined as: "any personal property, including
things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods,
instruments, investment property, letter of credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other mineral before
extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software." Idaho Code § 28-9-lO2(42).
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the bail agent in a fiduciary capacity. Idaho Code § 41-1043(2).
Aladdin argues that the Third Paragraph is a promise to pay; therefore it impliedly argues
that the Third Paragraph is a form of "promissory note." In the initial proceeding, Aladdin
claimed that the Third Paragraph is "collateral" and that "collateral means property of any kind.
Any kind. And [Aladdin] submit[s] that that any kind includes a promise to pay. A promise to
pay in the event of a breach." Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, LL. 13-18.
As a potential promissory note, Aladdin has argued that the Third Paragraph is a form of
security for the bail bond agreement. See, Appellant's Opening Brief at 14; A.R., pp. 60, 106;
and Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, LL. 19-26, and p. 13, LL. 1-6.
If the Third Paragraph is collateral, per Aladdin's argument, then the Third Paragraph is
an exception under Idaho Code § 41-1042(1) because "collateral is permitted by statute .... a
promise to pay apprehension expenses in the event of a breach, that is provided as security to
obtain the bail bond and guarantee validity of the principal's promise to appear. That falls
squarely within the definition of collateral." Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, LL. 19-26, p. 13, LL. 1-6.
Aladdin also similarly argued that "[ w]hen a principal or third party indemnitor agrees to
pay expenses in the event of forfeiture of the bond as set forth in Paragraph Three, that
agreement is given as security to obtain a bail bond and to guarantee the validity of the
principal's promise to appear as ordered by the court." A.R., pp. 59-60.
However, the Third Paragraph is not a promissory note nor is it "property of any kind
given as security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(4). Rather, the Third Paragraph
provides a form of recovery in event of a breach of the bail bond agreement by providing
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Aladdin and the surety recourse to the indemnitor for compensation of apprehension costs. The
Third Paragraph does not provide recourse to an "interest in personal property or fixtures that
secures payment or performance of an obligation[,]" of the principal or indemnitor. In re:

Wiersma, 283 B.R. at 305.
A promissory note

IS

an "instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary

obligation ... " Idaho Code § 28-9-102(65). "A 'promissory note' is itself merely a 'promise or
engagement, in writing, to pay a specified sum at a time therein limited ... to a person therein
named, or to his order, or bearer.'" In re: Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1347
(9 th Cir. 1983)(quoting, Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1093, (5 th Ed. 1979)). "Courts have defined a
'promissory note' as a written promise by one person to pay another person, absolutely and
unconditionally, a sum certain at a specified period of time."

Fineberg v. Credit Intern.

Bancshares, Ltd., 857 F.Supp. 338, 351 (DDel. 1994). See, also, Smith v. Union State Bank,
452 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983); and Price v. Mize, 628 P.2d 705 (Okla. 1981). "A
promissory note must not depend upon any contingency whatever." Henry Miller v. David

Austen, et ai, 54 U.S. 218,221 (1851).
The Third Paragraph provides Aladdin a remedy to recover apprehension costs in the
event the bonded defendant flees and must be captured and returned to the court. It is not a
promissory note.
In addition, a promissory note by itself does not create a security interest. By itself, "[a]
promissory note is merely a promise to pay-it is not security." Washington State Department of

Revenue v. Security Pacific Bank of Washington, N.A., 109 Wash.App. 795, 808, 38 P.3d 354,
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360 (2002). "[A] promissory note [does not] create a security interest." Shelton v. Erwin, 472
F.2d 1118, 1120 (8 th Cir. 1973). See, also, Idaho Code § 28-9-203.
In conclusion, the Third Paragraph is not collateral in the form of property of any kind
that grants to Aladdin or the surety recourse to property as security in the event of a breach of the
bail bond agreement. The Third Paragraph gives to Aladdin the right to look directly to the
indemnitor or defendant for reimbursement of apprehension expenses. As the Third Paragraph is
not "collateral" and not an exception within the meaning of Idaho Code § 41-1 042( 1)(b), it is not
a permitted charge for money or other valuable consideration and is prohibited by law.
E.

Legislative Intent and Public Policy.

1.

The Idaho Legislature has clearly expressed the public policy in relation to
bail bonds.

When amending Idaho's act that provides for licensing and regulation of bail agents, the
Idaho Legislature found:
(a) Bail agents provide an important local retail service to the retail consumers of
bail bonds;
(b) Retail consumers of bail bonds and bail agents reqUIre a uniform and
consistent regulatory framework that governs retail bail practices; and
(c) There is a need to provide consumer protection from unscrupulous and unfair
practices.
Idaho Code § 41-1037(2). (See, 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws at 165). In this section, the Legislature
expressed its findings about consistent regulation of bail bonds and the need for consumer
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protection. Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, furthers both concerns with regard to bail bond
transactions by regulating and restricting the permitted charges and collections by bail agents and
by holding bail agents to certain fiduciary standards when accepting collateral. See, sections 411042,41-1043, Idaho Code.
The issue here is to determine which charges are permitted under Idaho Code § 41-1042.
Aladdin has argued that the apprehension expenses as provided for in the Third Paragraph of its
standard bail agreement are permitted, either as collateral or in furtherance of the primary
purpose of bail, i.e., to ensure the appearance of a defendant before the Court. Aladdin also
argues that the Department's interpretation of the statute discourages bail agents "from returning
fugitives and instead encourages them to simply collect the amount of the forfeited bond. The
legislature would not have enacted a statute that thwarted public policy." Petitioner's Opening
Brief at 17.
Regardless of Aladdin's assertions, the Legislature's intent is clear. In order to provide a
uniform and consistent regulatory framework and to protect retail consumers, the Legislature
enacted law which prohibits certain charges or collection of other valuable consideration in bail
transactions except for certain permitted charges including premium, collateral, and certain
actual expenses. Aladdin's Third Paragraph is prohibited by law.

2.

Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not preclude an agreement for recovery of
apprehension costs outside the initial bail transaction.

On the other hand, Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not inhibit the entry of an indemnification
agreement with regard to apprehension costs after the parties have entered into the bail bond
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agreement.

If, as Aladdin has argued, the Third Paragraph is not a part of the bail bond

transaction, then an indemnification agreement could be entered into after entry of, and outside
of, the bail bond transaction and do no harm.

In the Hearing Officer's Findings, Conclusions, and Final Order on Request for
Declaratory Ruling [A.R., pp. 109-123], she explains well the effect and public policy issues of
entering into the indemnity agreement after the bail transaction has been completed:
The Department's interpretation is consistent with the statute, affords an option
for a bail agent to seek recovery for apprehension costs, and protects the public.
By permitting a bail agent to seek to enter into a new transaction, albeit related to
the bail transaction, for recovery of the principal including the reimbursement of
recovery and apprehension costs, the goals of encouraging recovery and ensuring
the presence of the defendant at court hearings are preserved. However, by also
requiring any agreement to reimburse apprehension costs to be entered into
completely separate and apart from and not as a condition to the bail transaction,
the interest of protecting the public is also well served. Mandating a separate
agreement for apprehension costs with the bail transaction not conditioned upon
its validity or existence protects an indemnitor from potentially unscrupulous and
unfair practices of incurring apprehension costs that an indemnitor could argue
were unnecessary or excessive.
A.R., pp. 118-119. Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, does not prevent the bail agent and the surety
from entering into an indemnity agreement with the defendant or other indemnitor after the
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initial bail bond transaction and before a defendant breaches the bail bond agreement by
absconding.

3.

An agreement for recovery of apprehension costs as a condition of the bail
transaction is contrary to the Legislature's expressed intent to protect
consumers.

For itself and its own business practices, Aladdin acknowledges the VIew that
apprehension costs must not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond. See,
Appellant's Opening Brief at 19. Outside of Aladdin's purported policy of limiting apprehension
costs, there is no true limitation on apprehension expenses as provided under the Third
Paragraph.
The law provides a limitation on collateral in section 41-1043, Idaho Code, where it
states: "A bail agent may accept collateral in connection with the bail bond transaction if the
collateral is not excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond." Idaho Code § 41-1043(1)
(underscore here). This restriction limits the amount of collateral the bail agent may accept.
However, it does not limit the amount of apprehension costs that can be collected for two
reasons: (1) the remedy afforded Aladdin in the Third Paragraph is not collateral and therefore
not subject to the section 41-1043 limitations on collateral, and (2) Aladdin's bail bond
agreement and its Third Paragraph do not cap such expenses.
The Third Paragraph states that the indemnitor will reimburse for:
actual expenses incurred and caused by a breach by the Principal of any of the
terms for which the application and Bail Bond were written, including all
expenses or liabilities incurred as a result of searching for, recapturing or
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returning the Principal to custody ...
A.R., p. 12 (See, "THIRD" paragraph) (underscore here).
When any defendant or indemnitor executes Aladdin's bail bond agreement form, the
terms of that agreement provide no limitation of apprehension expenses except that "no expenses
or liabilities incurred for recapturing or returning Principal to custody shall be chargeable after
the entry of Judgment." A.R., p. 12. (See, "THIRD" paragraph) (underscore here).

4.

Rule No.4, promulgated by the Department and effected by the Legislature,
furthers the purpose of Idaho Code § 41-1042.

The director of the Department of Insurance may "promulgate reasonable rules as are
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of [title 41, chapter 10, Idaho Code,]" which
includes bail bond statutes sections 41-1037 to 41-1045. Idaho Code § 41-1025.
As Aladdin notes in its Opening Brief at p. 27, the Department promulgated its Rule No.
4, "Rules Pertaining to Bail Agents." IDAPA 18.01.04. The Idaho Legislature then reviewed
Rule No.4 in accordance with sections 67-5224 and 67-5291, Idaho Code.
Section 67-5224, Idaho Code, provides that, before adoption of a rule, the "agency shall
consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule." Idaho Code § 675224(1). The agency publishes the text of a pending rule in the Idaho administrative bulletin
explaining, among other things, the reasons for adopting the proposed rule, the date on which the
pending rule will be final and effective, "and a statement that the pending rule may be rejected,
amended or modified by concurrent resolution of the legislature." Idaho Code § 67-5224(2).
"A pending rule shall become final and effective upon the conclusion of the legislative
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session at which the rule was submitted to the legislature for review, or as provided in the rule,
but no pending rule adopted by the agency shall become final and effective before conclusion of
the regular or special legislative session at which the rule was submitted for review." Idaho
Code § 67-5224(5)(a).
When the legislature takes action on the rule, i.e., when it either "approves, amends, or
modifies a pending rule pursuant to section 67-5291, Idaho Code, the rule becomes final and
effective upon adoption of the concurrent resolution or such other date specified in the
concurrent resolution." Idaho Code § 67-5224(5)(b).
"The standing committees of the legislature may review ... final rules which have been
published in the [Idaho administrative] bulletin or in the administrative code." Idaho Code § 675291. "A concurrent resolution may be adopted approving the rule, or rejecting, amending or
modifying the rule where it is determined that the rule violates the legislative intent of the statute
under which the rule was made ... " [d.
"At conclusion of the legislative session ... , the [administrative rules] coordinator shall
publish the date upon which the legislature adjourned sine die and rules became effective ... "
Idaho Code § 67-5224(7). Accordingly, the Department's Rule No.4 [IDAPA 18.01.04] became
final effective April 7, 2011, the date the Legislature adjourned sine die. Idaho Administrative
Bulletin 11-5 at 46, Docket No. 18-0104-1001.
As promulgated by the Department and reviewed by the Legislature in accordance with
title 67, chapter 52, Idaho Code, IDAPA 18.01.04 provides further interpretation and guidance
on allowable bail agent charges and fees that are regulated by the Department under Idaho Code
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§ 41-1042. See, Idaho Administrative Bulletin 11-5 at 46, Docket No. 18-0104-1001. The text

of the Department's Rule No.4 is here:
01. Charges for Bail Transaction. A bail agent shall not directly or indirectly
impose or seek to impose any fees or charges except for those permitted under
Section 41 1042, Idaho Code, as a part of any application, issuance, effectuation
or continuation of a bail bond.
02. Charges for Additional Services. Charges and fees outside the scope of
Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, such as charges for returning a defendant to
custody after a breach of the bail bond contract, must be negotiated separately
after the bail bond has been effectuated. Negotiations for additional charges shall
not be entered into as a part of the application, issuance and effectuation of a bail
bond and shall not be a condition of or requirement for entering into or continuing
a bail bond contract. Any fees or charges that are negotiated separately shall be
reasonable in relation to the expenses or services for which the fee or charge is
imposed and must be accompanied by a statement that clearly explains that any
agreement to pay fees or charges is not a requirement or condition to the validity
of the existing bail bond.
IDAPA 18.01.04.016.
The Department's Rule No.4 reinforces the intent of the Legislature to provide a
consistent regulatory framework and to protect consumers from unscrupUlous and unfair
practices.

See, Idaho Code § 41-1037.

It expresses clearly that apprehension charges for
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recovering an escaping defendant to the custody after a breach of the bail bond agreement "must
be negotiated separately after the bail bond has been effectuated." Such charges "shall not be a
condition of or requirement for entering into or continuing a bail bond contract."

IDAPA

18.01.04.016.02.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Idaho Department of Insurance, the Respondent herein, asks the Idaho Supreme
Court to uphold the ruling of the District Court, thereby upholding that an indemnity agreement
(Third Paragraph) in a bail bond transaction in the form as provided by Aladdin is not a
permitted charge of money or other valuable consideration as provided in section 41-1042, Idaho
Code.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5th day of December 2011.
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Deputy Attorney General
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